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EXPLORING THE ROOTS OF OUR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Samuel Walker*

THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE. By Lawrence M. Friedman and Robert V.
Percival Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1982.
Pp. xiii, 335. $21.
CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE. By .David Rothman. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1982. Pp. xxi, 464. $17.50.
Several years ago Lawrence Friedman admonished his fellow legal historians to leave their traditional realm of appellate court opinions and study
the much larger, messier and more mundane world of the day-to-day administration of justice. The reality of the law for most Americans does not
consist solely of the fine points of law found in appellate court opinions. In
the case of the criminal law, for example, the reality of the law is found in
the actions of police officers on the street, of prosecutors and defense attorneys in pretrial proceedings, and only occasionally in actual criminal trials.
These stages of the criminal process are what Yale Kamisar once called the
"gatehouses" of American criminal procedure. 1 Although largely hidden
from public view, they are far more important in terms of the actual impact
on peoples' lives than the more visible "mansions" represented by the opinions of appellate court judges.
Professor Friedman has taken his own advice to heart and, in collaboration with Robert V. Percival, one of his students, has produced one of those
rare books that can be truly characterized as a landmark. The Roots of
Justice reverberates throughout the field of legal history and the realm of
contemporary criminal justice studies. The authors give us a better overall
view (what the social scientists would call a "model") of how the criminal
justice system works than our criminologists and political scientists have
been able to fashion. It is ironic that although The Roots of Justice is a
work of history, it may well have more significance for contemporary social
science than for the field of history.
This is not to say that The Roots ofJustice is flawless. On several points
it is less than satisfying, especially where the authors fail to answer adequately the very questions they raise. Indeed, they seem to waffle on the
most important point. But such failings pale in significance when measured
against the truly impressive accomplishment they have made.
Friedman and Percival set out to produce a "snapshot" of the workings
of one local criminal justice system. They chose Alameda County, Califor• Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
-Ed.
1. Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1980),
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nia (ofwhich Oakland is the principal city) between 1870 and 1910. It was
a fortunate choice because an apparently large body of official records has
survived. The book is rich in detail, not just with respect to general patterns
but about particular cases, which gives it the feel of specificity. We cannot,
of course, assume that Alameda County was or is typical of criminal justice
systems elsewhere in the country, and the authors make the appropriate
disclaimers. But in other ways the snapshot provided by The Roots of Justice identifies important general phenomena about the administration of
justice. Its principal contribution lies in its effort to grasp one entire local
criminal justice system, from police operations to sentencing and punishment of convicted offenders.
The Roots of Justice is a commentary on much of the literature in the
field of criminal justice. In a curious way it establishes an implicit dialogue
with the second book reviewed here, Conscience and Convenience, by David
Rothman.2 The dialogue primarily involves methodology. But, as we shall
see, issues of methodology are crucial for dealing with the substantive questions of how our criminal justice system works and, in particular, how it
changes. Both of these books raise provocative points about the prospects
for the "reform" of criminal justice, points that are extremely relevant to
current policy debates.
In its effort to grasp the day-to-day workings of one local criminal justice system, The Roots ofJustice illuminates two major shortcomings of existing scholarship in the field of criminal justice history. The first is the fact
that most studies deal with only one institution. Thus, we have studies of
the police, courts, or correctional institutions in a particular time or place.
Some take a regional or national perspective, but all are essentially partial
views. They do not tell us how the apparatus of criminal justice functions
as a whole and cannot, therefore, begin to address the fundamental questions of the quality of justice. What we want to know is, to put it crudely,
"who got what?" If Friedman and Percival do not quite answer this question to our satisfaction, they have at least brought us to the point where the
question can be considered seriously. That alone is an impressive
achievement.
The second great shortcoming of criminal justice history has been the
neglect of the day-to-day administration of justice. Existing studies tend to
be accounts of the creation of institutions. Rothman's The .Discovery of the
Asylum 3 is one of the better examples of the genre. One finds a common
dramatic structure in these works. They open with a description of the old
order; the rising action involves the mobilization of the reform effort; the
dramatic climax is the creation of the new institution; finally the falling
action traces the failure of the institution to fulfill the hopes and dreams of
its creators.
A number of problems are associated with this approach to history. The
most serious is that the story is told from the point of view of the reformers.
The narrative is energized by their critique of the old order, their agenda
2. In many ways, this book is an improvement over Rothman's earlier prize-winning work
examining the Jacksonian origins of the asylum in the United States. See D. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
3. Id
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for reform, their success and subsequent disillusionment. Methodologically, these histories tend to rely primarily on the writings of the reformers,
and we are generally asked to accept their view of things at face value. This
is essentially a form of intellectual history, an account of ideas about crime
and justice told from the perspective of the reformers. The JJiscovery of the
Asylum relies heavily on the "pamphlet wars" between the advocates of
different approaches to prison design. (Thus, the "war" is really a skirmish
between rival groups of reformers.) The point here is not that The JJiscovery of the Asylum is a bad book; rather, because it is one of the best in the
field, it illustrates the limitations of the approach it takes.
There are, of course, different fashions in intellectual history. For decades the dominant school of thought offered a liberal-progressive interpretation of criminal justice history. This view took at face value the
assumptions of the reformers about such things as the role of police and
prisons. If the institutions failed, it was because intervening factors, usually
political interference, preventeci them from fulfilling their intended mission.
More recently, an anti-progressive school has come to the fore. The JJiscovery of the Asylum was and is the most influential statement of this view. 4
The anti-progressive view simply turns the liberal-progressive view upside
down. It treats the assumptions of the reformers as inherently suspect and
regards the institution as doomed from the start. Anthony Platt's influential
account of the juvenile court, The Child Savers, 5 joins Rothman's book as
one of the best examples of this approach.
While the anti-progressive school is appropriately more skeptical of reform and reformers than is the liberal-progressive school, it still views
events through the eyes of the reformers. Rothman's current volume, Conscience and Convenience, represents a considerable advance, if only because
it takes into account the views of a wider range of actors in the drama.
Accordingly, it heightens our appreciation for the complexity of the politics
of social change.
The Roots ofJustice takes an entirely different approach. Eschewing intellectual history, it seeks to give us an administrative history of how criminal justice institutions actually functioned. It allows us to begin to grapple
with the fundamental questions of social history: What role did these institutions play in the broader context of society? How did the machinery of
justice affect peoples' lives? What was the role of criminal justice in the
allocation of power and opportunity in American society?
Given the task, Friedman and Percival necessarily had to employ a
quantitative methodology. They needed to identify the general patterns of
institutional behavior by examining large data sets. The quantitative approach has emerged as the major alternative to the dominant intellectual/political approach to criminal justice history. Its partisans, led by Eric
Monkkonen, have been aggressive in asserting its potential.
A major part of the achievement of The Roots of Justice is its common
sense application of methodology. Quantitative history has enormous
4. Id. For an analysis of this book in light of Francis Allen's "rehabilitative ideal," see
Schneider, The Rise ofPrisons and the Origins ofthe Rehabilitative Ideal, 17 MICH. L. REV, 707
(1979).
5. A. PLATI, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969).
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promise, not the least of which is its potential for exploring basic questions
that other methodologies cannot begin to examine. But it also entails a
number of its own problems, not the least of which is determining exactly
what all those numbers mean. Arrest rates, for example, are not necessarily
a valid indicator of the level of crime and disorder. The quantitative partisans make a strategic retreat in the face of this criticism and argue that the
numbers are a valid indicator of bureaucratic activity. True enough, but it
begs the question of what factors shape changes in bureaucratic behavior.
Why, for example, do arrest rates go up or down? The numbers themselves
cannot tell us whether it was because of changes in the level of crime, or
changes in public attitudes about criminal behavior, or factors inside the
bureaucratic agency itself.
Friedman and Percival manifest a refreshing degree of perception in
responding to these complex questions. Steering a middle course, they
point out that both traditional and newer quantitative methodologies can
be "misused or abused" (p. 15). Thus, they use both methods: "Wherever
possible, we drew samples and counted cases; some times we ran simple
statistical tests. But at every step of the way we also tried to get behind our
figures. We read reams and reams of documents, stuck away in drawers in
the courthouse basement" (p. 15). They supplemented the data sets with
anecdotal material from particular cases. "Both steps, we felt, were necessary. Without figures, we have only impressions, stories, fleeting moments,
vague opinions. Numbers alone, on the other hand, are blind and mysterious: tablets written in an undeciphered script" (p. 15). Amen. The
message here is one that partisans on all sides of the methodological wars
should heed.
So much for methodology. Given these tools, what did Friedman and
Percival find? Ironically, the most important substantive contribution of
'I7ze Roots ofJustice emerges not from the detailed analysis of the numbers
but from the general conceptualization of the criminal justice system. The
result is a "model" of American criminal justice that vastly improves over
any currently available in the social science literature.
There is no single criminal justice system, they argue. Instead, there are
several systems functioning simultaneously. Friedman and Percival posit a
"wedding cake" model of criminal justice. At the top are a handful of "celebrated" cases which, for one reason or another, are unique and receive an
inordinate amount of publicity. Because of the publicity, they shape public
thinking about criminal justice despite the fact that they are completely unrepresentative. In the second layer are the routine felonies, and here we
find the real business of crime control. Cases here are disposed of in an
informal and highly routine fashion. As is true today, trials were rare in the
period studied. Finally, the third layer involves the truly petty cases, the
minor breaches of the peace and violations of local ordinances. The object
is not so much punishment of crime as it is the imposition of discipline on
those unlucky enough to be swept up into the system.
Each of these layers functioned in a very different fashion. The celebrated cases in the top layer involved the full-blown criminal process, including that rare event, the jury trial. Many, if not most, of the detailed
technicalities of criminal procedure were invoked in such cases. The middle layer involved what we now recognize as a bureaucratized system of
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justice. Cases were disposed of in the most convenient manner possible convenient, that is, from the perspective of the officials maintaining the system. The bottom layer hardly resembled a system of 'Justice" at all. Legal
niceties had little relevance, and cases were processed en masse.
This wedding cake model is a relevant description of contemporary
criminal justice. We are familiar with the few celebrated cases, such as the
recent John W. Hinckley trial, which have a grossly disproportionate effect
on public awareness. We also recognize the informality with which routine
felonies are handled. And we know that our municipal courts process cases
en masse and pay scant attention to the formalities of criminal procedure.
This wedding cake model is a substantial improvement over the unitary
models offered by contemporary social scientists that fail to take into account the very different ways in which different categories of offenses are
handled.
The policy implications of this model are substantial. Friedman and
Percival are telling us that the "roots" of contemporary criminal justice are
deep indeed. Consider the matter of plea bargaining. Obviously it is not a
new phenomenon, and those commentators who talk of the "twilight" of
the adversary system and the "decline" of the jury trial misread our history.
The idea that we once enjoyed an adversarial system of justice is a sentimental fiction. The implications for reform are obvious: We will not readily "abolish" or even substantially restrict plea bargaining for there is no
golden age of adversarial justice to which we can return.
The wedding cake model also suggests the hazards of confusing events
that occur in different layers of the system. The recent uproar following the
John W. Hinckley verdict is an excellent example of how the results of one
celebrated case may be used to promote "reforms" (in this case the abolition or restriction of the insanity defense) in another layer. Friedman and
Percival's model sensitizes us to the point that the insanity defense, as one
technicality of criminal procedure, has little practical relevance for the
enormous volume of business in the second layer of the criminal justice
wedding cake. Those who think that closing this alleged "loophole" will
reduce crime or even substantially modify the processing of felonies are
seriously mistaken.
Friedman and Percival conclude, with respect to reform, that
"[s]omehow, reforms rarely 'worked' in the long run" in Alameda County
(p. 323). The criminal justice system is too complex, too resilient, and it
"resists deep structural reform" (p. 325). David Rothman has some equally
penetrating insights into the nature of reform in Conscience and Convenience. But before turning to this book, I must comment on the major failing
of The Roots ef Justice.
Friedman and Percival are least successful in answering their own questions about the role of criminal justice in society. The issue has been posed
in recent years by radical and Marxist criminal justice scholars: Is the machinery of justice a tool for maintaining systematic social inequities? Does
it serve to keep the outcast out and the downtrodden down? In a section on
"Class Justice and the Functions of Criminal Law" (pp. 315-18), the authors waffle, and their answer is not really satisfying. "These are ques-

March 1983]

The Roots

of Justice

951

tions," they write, "that we cannot really answer from our data." While no
definitive answers are likely, more extended consideration seems in order.
Conscience and Convenience is a sequel to Rothman's earlier study, covering the second great period of institution-building in American criminal
justice. Whereas The Discovery ofthe Asylum explored the development of
the prison in the pre-Civil War era, this volume deals with the rapid spread
of probation, parole, the indeterminate sentence, and the juvenile court in
the Progressive Era. The ideas underlying these institutions had been circulating for decades, and there had been a few tentative experiments prior to
1899. In a remarkable burst of institution-building during the next sixteen
years, these institutions became the established norm in American criminal
justice. After 1915 only a few states lacked these components of what is
now the full criminal justice "system."
The most significant part of Rothman's account is not the story of the
creation of these institutions but of their subsequent survival in the face of
widespread public hostility. By the early 1920's parole was in disrepute. A
large segment of the public accused parole boards of excessive leniency and
found them guilty of releasing allegedly dangerous felons into society. The
mood and rhetoric of the period bears a striking resemblance to our situation today. Other critics were aware that parole boards lacked any real
scientific basis for their decisions concerning the release of prisoners. Parole boards were only the most convenient whipping boys. To indict parole, after all, was to indict not only the indeterminate sentence but the very
philosophical underpinnings of our methods of dealing with convicted offenders. Long implicit in criticisms of existing institutions, this philosophical debate did not really surface until the mid-1970s.
Rothman points out that parole survived this pervasive disillusionment,
and the explanation is contained in the title of this book: Parole proved
administratively convenient for key criminal justice officials. The parole
bureaucracy had a vested interest in maintaining the institution. Possibly
even more important were the prison officials who found that parole served
a number of important administrative needs. Parole was a mechanism both
for maintaining control over the inmates themselves and for managing the
size of the prison population. Other officials, police chiefs and judges, while
unhappy with many features of parole, deferred to the needs of their fellow
administrators. Reform may well have sprung from the collective conscience of well-meaning reformers, but the convenience of administrators
determined both its ultimate form and its ability to survive.
Conscience and Convenience represents an advance over The Discovery
of the Asylum because it takes into account a wider range of actors. The
first volume was too much an exercise in intellectual history, relying primarily on the expressed views of the active reformers. It told us too little
about the ideas and actions of other key actors, notably the legislators who
authorized the first prisons and the judges who were given new sentencing
options. The story is perhaps a bit more complex than The Discovery ofthe
Asylum would lead us to believe. Conscience and Convenience, while working with essentially the same methodology, adds new dimensions to the
story and enhances our appreciation for the complexity of social change.
To be sure, it is still a form of intellectual history. It tells us what key
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officials thought rather than how the institutions actually functioned; nevertheless, it is an improved form of the genre.
By a different route, Rothman has reached some conclusions about the
nature of criminal justice reform similar to those of Friedman and Percival.
The potential for fundamental change in existing institutions is limited indeed. Friedman and Percival tell us that it is because of deeply rooted dayto-day processes. Rothman shows us how those processes are viewed from
the perspective of the officials who run the institutions. The parallels between the 1920's, as described by Rothman, and the 1980's are striking. In
both periods an era of hopeful reform and experimentation gives way to
one of fear and frustration. Now, as in the 1920's, a conservative crime
control mood reigns, and we are witnessing a variety of proposals designed
to get tough with criminals. Both of these books suggest that this conservative reform effort will not seriously alter the basic processes of American
criminal justice. But those who oppose the current conservative proposals
should not take any comfort in this, for the sword cuts both ways. Those
who have a different view of the problems of our criminal justice system are
no more likely to be able, should the political mood shift, to effect any
fundamental changes either.
The message implicit in these two books is depressing indeed. It is all
the more depressing because the books are so persuasive. These two books
are the products of mature scholars at the height of their powers. Friedman
and Rothman have thought deeply about the nature of our criminal justice
system and have presented us with two extremely important works. We can
only hope that they will continue their respective lines of inquiry and that
the junior member of this group, Robert Percival, will pursue the scholarly
inquiry he has begun.

